Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly
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Publication:692106
DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0036-1zbMath1252.91068MaRDI QIDQ692106
Publication date: 4 December 2012
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2010s-16.pdf
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
91B60: Trade models
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91A25: Dynamic games
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