Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0036-1zbMath1252.91068MaRDI QIDQ692106

Ngo Van Long, Kenji Fujiwara

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2010s-16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic game; exhaustible resource; feedback equilibria; Stackelberg leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91B60: Trade models

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91A25: Dynamic games

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