Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0036-1zbMath1252.91068OpenAlexW2101778356MaRDI QIDQ692106

Ngo Van Long, Kenji Fujiwara

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2010s-16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameexhaustible resourcefeedback equilibriaStackelberg leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (3)

Carbon Tax and OPEC’s Rents Under a Ceiling Constraint* ⋮ OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING ⋮ Intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria

Cites Work

• A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation
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