Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0036-1MaRDI QIDQ692106zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kenji Fujiwara, Ngo Van Long

Publication date 4 December 2012

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2010s-16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameexhaustible resourcefeedback equilibriaStackelberg leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193639 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources

Cited in

(9)

• Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach
• Welfare comparison of leader-follower models in a mixed duopoly
• Voracity, growth, and welfare
• Intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria
• Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint
• Welfare-improving effect of a small number of followers in a Stackelberg model
• OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING
• Economics of leadership and hierarchy
• When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

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