OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING

DOI10.1142/S021919891240004XzbMath1272.91080OpenAlexW1984423735MaRDI QIDQ4916140

Ngo Van Long, Kenji Fujiwara

Publication date: 19 April 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891240004x

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamefeedback Stackelberg equilibriumfeedback Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
• Welfare implications of leadership in a resource market under bilateral monopoly
• The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism
• Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
• Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing

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