How different can strategic models be?

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1034zbMATH Open0772.90095OpenAlexW1987774689MaRDI QIDQ1802034FDOQ1802034

Authors: P. Dutta, Rangarajan K. Sundaram 

Publication date: 11 October 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1034

Recommendations

• Models of strategic behavior
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193910
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7533366
• How Profitable Are Strategic Behaviors in a Market?
• Continuous strategic models
• Evaluating strategic alternatives: An analytical model
• Do we need models ?

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriacommon-property resource models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (25)

• On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly
• Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• Euler-Lagrange equations of stochastic differential games: application to a game of a productive asset
• Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
• Dynamic games with an application to climate change models
• The commons with capital markets
• Comparative dynamics in a productive asset oligopoly
• Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons?
• Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
• On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
• The tragedy of the commons?
• Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly.
• Analysis of Nash equilibria in a class of capital accumulation games
• How Profitable Are Strategic Behaviors in a Market?
• Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time
• On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach
• Tax schemes in a class of differential games
• Forecast horizons for a class of dynamic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The effects of market structure on industry growth: rivalrous non-excludable capital
• Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion
• Rational noncooperative strategic exploitation of species in a predator-prey ecosystem with random disturbances

This page was built for publication: How different can strategic models be?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1802034)