Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1164MaRDI QIDQ1604647zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nancy McCarthy, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry

Publication date 8 July 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10535/5694

zbMATH Keywords

common pool resourcecostssupervision mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

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• A free lunch in the commons
• Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under rational learning about its reproduction
• Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics
• Does inequality lead to greater efficiency in the use of local commons? The role of strategic investments in capacity.
• Dark matters: exploitation as cooperation
• The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
• Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?
• Common pool equities: An arbitrage based non-cooperative solution to the common pool resource problem
• Characterizing actions in a dynamic common pool resource game
• Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula

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