Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
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Publication:532681
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0159-4zbMath1211.91055MaRDI QIDQ532681
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0159-4
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B12: Voting theory
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
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A sequential selection game with vetoes, Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
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