Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0159-4zbMath1211.91055OpenAlexW1977244024MaRDI QIDQ532681

Shmuel Gal, Steven Alpern

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0159-4

zbMATH Keywords

votingstochastic gamecommitteeveto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (2)

A sequential selection game with vetoes ⋮ Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem

Cites Work

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• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Optimal Challenges for Selection

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