A folk theorem for dynamic games

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90004-3zbMath0802.90146OpenAlexW1999522139MaRDI QIDQ1322712

Vladimir Gaitsgory, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 5 May 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90004-3

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic duopolistic competitionclosed-loop strategiesopen-loop strategiescompetitive arms racedynamic voluntary provision of public goodsinfinite horizon dynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Economic growth models (91B62) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

ON A CLASS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES ⋮ Some recent aspects of differential game theory

Cites Work

• Cooperative equilibria in differential games
• A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
• The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
• Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• Unnamed Item

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