Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation

DOI10.2307/2526633zbMath0696.90098OpenAlexW2014572674MaRDI QIDQ3474507

Frederick van der Ploeg, Aart J. De Zeeuw

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1141346/PFZA5616113.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

arms racefeedback solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (13)

Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package ⋮ A dynamic model of capital and arms accumulation ⋮ Optimal military spending, trade and stochastic economic growth ⋮ MILITARY SPENDING, THREATS AND STOCHASTIC GROWTH ⋮ The arms trade and the stability of regional arms races ⋮ Military spending and stochastic growth ⋮ Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation ⋮ On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria ⋮ On the time consistency of equilibria in a class of additively separable differential games ⋮ On coincidence of feedback Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria in economic applications of differential games ⋮ Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games ⋮ Complete asymptotic analysis of a two-nation arms race model with piecewise constant nonlinearities ⋮ A folk theorem for dynamic games

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