Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package
DOI10.1007/BF00437234zbMath0736.90020OpenAlexW2092892761MaRDI QIDQ3980458
Frederick van der Ploeg, A. J. Markink
Publication date: 26 June 1992
Published in: Computer Science in Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00437234
rational expectationstime inconsistencyinfinite horizonscooperative, decentralized Nash outcomedecentralized Stackelberg outcomesquadratic preferences
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-04)
Related Items (1)
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Cites Work
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- Nonzero-sum differential games
- Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
- On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
- Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
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- Saddlepoint Problems in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models: A General Method and Some Macroeconomic Examples
- How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
- Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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