How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3806954
DOI10.2307/2297581zbMath0657.90021OpenAlexW1985095078MaRDI QIDQ3806954
No author found.
Publication date: 1988
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297581
HamiltonianNash equilibriumdynamic gametime-consistent policyprecommitmentoptimal government policies
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Dynamic programming (90C39) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items
Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach, Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package, Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth, Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games, Government-private sector relations as a Stackelberg game. A degenerate case, The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games, Time-consistent control in nonlinear models, Optimal policy business cycles, Optimal introduction of time-of-day tariffs in the presence of consumer adjustment costs, INTERTEMPORAL INVESTMENTS INTO SYNFUELS, Time inconsistency in time-dependent team games, Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information, Optimal target zones, Fiscal policy coordination and EMU, Large external debt and (slow) domestic growth, Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes, Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems, Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables, On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games, Examples in Dynamic Optimal Taxation, Time consistent fiscal policies in a Ramsey economy, THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME, Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation, Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games, Time Consistency, Subgame Perfectness, Solution Concepts and Information Patterns in Dynamic Models of Stabilization Policies
