Fiscal policy coordination and EMU

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0MaRDI QIDQ671865zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Levine, Andrew Brociner

Publication date 27 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0

zbMATH Keywords

Fiscal policy coordinationMarket structureReputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Fiscal leadership and coordination in the EMU
• Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach
• Monetary and Fiscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
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• Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union

Cites work

• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations

Cited in

(19)

• Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization
• Fiscal equalisation: principles and an application to the European Union
• Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union
• Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion
• Transatlantic trade-offs in the age of balanced budgets and European monetary union
• Fiscal leadership and coordination in the EMU
• Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stabilizations: what are the gains from cooperation?
• Monetary and Fiscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
• On the logic of fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union
• Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU.
• Gauging the effects of fiscal stimulus packages in the Euro area
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908186 (Why is no real title available?)
• Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union
• EUROPEAN FISCAL DISCIPLINE BEFORE AND AFTER EMU: CRASH DIET OR PERMANENT WEIGHT LOSS?
• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• How important is fiscal policy cooperation in a currency union?
• A common election day for euro-zone member states?
• Fiscal federalism in a monetary union: the no-cooperation pitfall
• The need for economic policy coordination between Europe, Japan and the United States: Policy recommendations for the 1990s

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