Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems
DOI10.2478/S11533-009-0040-5zbMATH Open1183.91020OpenAlexW2079392494MaRDI QIDQ2268529FDOQ2268529
Authors: Rossen Rozenov, Mikhail Krastanov 
Publication date: 8 March 2010
Published in: Central European Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/s11533-009-0040-5
Recommendations
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Optimality conditions for problems involving ordinary differential equations (49K15) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
- Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory
- How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
- On coincidence of feedback Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria in economic applications of differential games
- On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
- Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation
- Transitional Dynamics of Optimal Capital Taxation
Cited In (5)
- On Optimal Redistributive Capital Income Taxation
- On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems
- Bifurcation mechanism design -- from optimal flat taxes to better cancer treatments
- Differential Games and Optimal Tax Policy
- OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PROFIT TAXATION: THE DERIVATION OF FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA
This page was built for publication: Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2268529)
