Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90008-5zbMATH Open0716.90010OpenAlexW1518681786MaRDI QIDQ753631FDOQ753631

Authors: Tamer Başar, Mark Salmon 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/340

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zbMATH Keywords

monetary authorityoptimal Stackelberg policysuboptimal certainty- equivalent Nash policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic growth models (91B62) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Cites Work

• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Solutions to a class of nonstandard stochastic control problems with active learning
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games

Cited In (7)

• Information dissemination in currency crises
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.
• CAUTION OR ACTIVISM? MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information structure and the transmission of inflationary expectations
• Learning rational expectations in a policy game

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