Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90008-5MaRDI QIDQ753631zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tamer Başar, Mark Salmon

Publication date 1990

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1814/340

zbMATH Keywords

monetary authorityoptimal Stackelberg policysuboptimal certainty- equivalent Nash policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic growth models (91B62) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Recommendations

• On credible monetary policy and private government information
• Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177088
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world

Cites work

• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Solutions to a class of nonstandard stochastic control problems with active learning

Cited in

(7)

• Information dissemination in currency crises
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.
• CAUTION OR ACTIVISM? MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177088 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information structure and the transmission of inflationary expectations
• Learning rational expectations in a policy game

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