Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
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Publication:1017056
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2006.05.006zbMath1201.91140OpenAlexW2057838166MaRDI QIDQ1017056
Christopher Sleet, Şevin Yeltekin
Publication date: 18 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.05.006
Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (4)
The signaling effect of raising inflation ⋮ Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information
Cites Work
- Credible public policy
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
- Expectation traps and discretion
- Sustainable monetary policies
- Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets
- EXPECTATIONS, CREDIBILITY, AND TIME-CONSISTENT MONETARY POLICY
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy
- Optimal Monetary Policy
- Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- On credible monetary policy and private government information
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