Expectation traps and discretion
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Publication:1270747
DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2421zbMATH Open0910.90033OpenAlexW3123020346MaRDI QIDQ1270747FDOQ1270747
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum, V. V. Chari
Publication date: 3 November 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5541.pdf
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Cited In (17)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.
- Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy
- Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
- On credible monetary policy and private government information
- Equilibrium and government commitment
- Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
- Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
- The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
- Optimal taxes without commitment
- CAN THE U.S. MONETARY POLICY FALL (AGAIN) IN AN EXPECTATION TRAP?
- Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication
- Expectation traps in a New Keynesian open economy model
- Introduction to modeling money and studying monetary policy
- Heterogeneity and monetary policy
- Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity
- Ex post heterogeneity and the business cycle
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