Optimal taxes without commitment

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2334zbMath0896.90078MaRDI QIDQ1385269

Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini

Publication date: 26 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/64c161970cab8a0d1e1ccfa6fe9f7b5bcbd67073

zbMATH Keywords

optimal taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)

Related Items

Time-consistent control in nonlinear models, Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy, Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies, Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes, Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment, The geometry of optimal taxation: a primal approach, Optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets, Lagrange multipliers in incentive-constrained problems, On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games, Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time, Taxation without commitment, Sustaining Ramsey plans with one-period bonds, Dynamic economic equilibrium under redistribution

Cites Work

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• Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
• Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation