On credible monetary policy and private government information

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2806zbMath1007.91042MaRDI QIDQ5947399

Christopher Sleet

Publication date: 13 December 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/013966416ea1f6b9972ed696d7ad8cc2905d85fe

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policy; equilibrium path; private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)

Related Items

The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information, Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information, Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets

Cites Work

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