On credible monetary policy and private government information
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Publication:5947399
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2806zbMath1007.91042OpenAlexW2039370393MaRDI QIDQ5947399
Publication date: 13 December 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/013966416ea1f6b9972ed696d7ad8cc2905d85fe
Related Items (3)
The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information ⋮ Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets ⋮ Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
Cites Work
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- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
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