The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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Publication:4316532
DOI10.2307/2951505zbMath0819.90137OpenAlexW2156763099WikidataQ56481642 ScholiaQ56481642MaRDI QIDQ4316532
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 11 December 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63634
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