Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods

DOI10.1007/S11238-022-09894-9MaRDI QIDQ2694752zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 4 April 2023

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09894-9

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiongames with incomplete informationperfect Bayesian equilibriumpooling contractsoptimal contracts with commitmentoptimal contracts with no commitmentseparating contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Optimal finite horizon contract with limited commitment
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Cites work

• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Cited in

(9)

• Optimal finite horizon contract with limited commitment
• Solving an infinite horizon adverse selection model through finite policy graphs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7295776 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Making promises in infinite-horizon economies with default and collateral
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7366626 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations

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