Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
DOI10.1007/S11238-022-09894-9OpenAlexW4286486912MaRDI QIDQ2694752FDOQ2694752
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 4 April 2023
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09894-9
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adverse selectiongames with incomplete informationperfect Bayesian equilibriumpooling contractsoptimal contracts with commitmentoptimal contracts with no commitmentseparating contracts
Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Cited In (9)
- Optimal finite horizon contract with limited commitment
- Solving an infinite horizon adverse selection model through finite policy graphs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
- Making promises in infinite-horizon economies with default and collateral
- Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
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