Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect

DOI10.3982/TE2449zbMath1466.91161MaRDI QIDQ4991726

Dino Gerardi, Lucas Maestri

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentratchet effectdynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (7)

Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ The curse of long horizons ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods ⋮ Screening by mode of trade ⋮ Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

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