The curse of long horizons
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2425142
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.01.009zbMATH Open1417.91310OpenAlexW3123886725MaRDI QIDQ2425142FDOQ2425142
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.01.009
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Persistent private information
- Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
- Two-sided learning and the ratchet principle
Cited In (13)
- The curse of simultaneity
- The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Production priorities in dynamic relationships
- Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- Myopic agency
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- Moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy
- Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
This page was built for publication: The curse of long horizons
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2425142)
