The curse of long horizons
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Publication:2425142
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3863589 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Persistent private information
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
- Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Two-sided learning and the ratchet principle
Cited in
(13)- Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
- Moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy
- The curse of simultaneity
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
- Production priorities in dynamic relationships
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Myopic agency
- Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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