Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109108MaRDI QIDQ2180753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hong Gao, Haibo Xu

Publication date 14 May 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109108

zbMATH Keywords

belief manipulationhidden actionhidden informationrelationship termination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Applications of game theory (91A80) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Career concerns with exponential learning
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• The curse of long horizons
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(8)

• Optimal self-enforcement and termination
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
• Progressive learning
• Production priorities in dynamic relationships
• Termination as an incentive device
• Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining

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