Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAC034MaRDI QIDQ6104787zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aaron M. Kolb

Publication date 28 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac034

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect monitoringprincipal-agent modelunderminingvariable stakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

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(2)

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