Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
- Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the U. S. steel industry
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- On selecting the right agent
- Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring
- Repeated delegation
Cited in
(11)- Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams
- Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining
- Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
- Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
- When (not) to publicize inspection results
- Monitoring and control of anytime algorithms: A dynamic programming approach
- Economics of collective monitoring: a study of environmentally constrained electricity generators
- Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring
- Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
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