Dynamic contracts with random monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.07.008OpenAlexW2504300416WikidataQ127233545 ScholiaQ127233545MaRDI QIDQ2283129FDOQ2283129

Authors: Andrei Barbos 

Publication date: 30 December 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.008

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddynamic contractsoptimal contractsrandom monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
• MARKET‐BASED INCENTIVES
• An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage-Productivity Gaps

Cited In (10)

• Optimal contracts with random monitoring
• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
• Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma
• Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
• Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
• Monitoring innovation
• Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
• Optimal contracts with shirking
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

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