Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
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Publication:2283129
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.07.008OpenAlexW2504300416WikidataQ127233545 ScholiaQ127233545MaRDI QIDQ2283129
Publication date: 30 December 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.008
Related Items (3)
Optimal contracts with random monitoring ⋮ Monitoring innovation ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
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