Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
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Publication:2283129
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5135703 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- A First Course in Optimization Theory
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage-Productivity Gaps
- Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
- Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
- Learning and Wage Dynamics
- Market-based incentives
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention
- Wages, Experience and Seniority
- When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
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- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
- Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring
- Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
- Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
- Monotone contracts
- Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Optimal contract for machine repair and maintenance
- Optimal contracts with shirking
- Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma
- Monitoring innovation
- Production priorities in dynamic relationships
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
- Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
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