Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
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Publication:5190481
DOI10.3982/ECTA7261zbMath1202.91182OpenAlexW1748509479MaRDI QIDQ5190481
Bruno Biais, Stéphane Villeneuve, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet
Publication date: 18 March 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7261
principal-agent modelinvestmentdownsizingcontinuous timelimited liabilityPoisson riskfirm size dynamics
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