Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
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Publication:5190481
DOI10.3982/ECTA7261zbMATH Open1202.91182OpenAlexW1748509479MaRDI QIDQ5190481FDOQ5190481
Authors: Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, Stéphane Villeneuve 
Publication date: 18 March 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7261
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investmentcontinuous timelimited liabilityprincipal-agent modeldownsizingPoisson riskfirm size dynamics
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- Optimal contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships
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- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors
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- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
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- Using value-at-risk to reconcile limited liability and the moral-hazard problem
- Dynamic regulation on innovation and adoption of green technology with information asymmetry
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Repeated delegation
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
- Optimal contract for machine repair and maintenance
- Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning
- A continuous-time model of self-protection
- Moral hazard with the (unlikely) possibility of catastrophes
- Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation
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