Optimal contract with moral hazard for Public Private Partnerships

DOI10.1080/17442508.2017.1303068zbMath1395.91279arXiv1703.01754OpenAlexW2594616249MaRDI QIDQ4584683

Ishak Hajjej, Caroline Hillairet, Mohammed Mnif, Monique Pontier

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: Stochastics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.01754

zbMATH Keywords

HJB equationmoral hazardstochastic control under partial informationpublic private partnership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard

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