Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.08.050MaRDI QIDQ2029938zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florina Silaghi, Sudipto Sarkar

Publication date 4 June 2021

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.050

zbMATH Keywords

agency problemfinanceinvestment analysispublic and private partnershipreal options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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Cites work

• Capacity choice in (strategic) real options models: a survey
• Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms
• Investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand
• Investment strategies, reversibility, and asymmetric information
• Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework
• Investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies
• Optimal investment in learning-curve technologies
• Real options in operations research: a review
• Replacement decisions with multiple stochastic values and depreciation
• Sharing risk through concession contracts
• The interaction of debt financing, cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty
• The simple economics of white elephants

Cited in

(15)

• The simple economics of white elephants
• Trade credit contracts: design and regulation
• Demand uncertainty, product differentiation, and entry timing under spatial competition
• How to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships
• Optimal contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships
• A modelization of public-private partnerships with failure time
• Agency Conflicts and Risk Management*
• Public private partnerships contract under moral hazard and ambiguous information
• Risk sharing in public-private partnerships
• Contractual flexibility, firm effort, and subsidy design: a comparison of PPP project contracts
• Impact of privatization on social welfare in the service supply chain
• An analysis of information disclosure in build-operate-transfer road projects
• Bi-level optimisation of subsidy and capacity investment under competition and uncertainty
• Strategic capacity investment and optimal subsidies with carbon emission reduction
• Sharing risk through concession contracts

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