Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.025zbMath1238.90081OpenAlexW1964203919MaRDI QIDQ420892

Takashi Shibata, Michi Nishihara

Publication date: 23 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.025

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesagencyinvestment timingprivatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (9)

Optimal exercise of jointly held real options: a Nash bargaining approach with value diversion ⋮ Investment timing, debt structure, and financing constraints ⋮ Strategic entry in a triopoly market of firms with asymmetric cost structures ⋮ Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty ⋮ Investment strategies, reversibility, and asymmetric information ⋮ Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information ⋮ Investment Timing and Quantity Strategies under Asymmetric Information ⋮ Real options in operations research: a review ⋮ Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects

Cites Work

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• Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict
• Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms
• The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship
• Strategic technology adoption taking into account future technological improvements: a real options approach
• Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework
• The impacts of uncertainties in a real options model under incomplete information
• Evaluation of firm's loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision

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