How do information ambiguity and timing of contextual information affect managers' goal congruence in making investment decisions in good times vs. bad times?
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Publication:2575460
DOI10.1007/S11166-005-3553-8zbMATH Open1118.91324OpenAlexW2072045518MaRDI QIDQ2575460FDOQ2575460
L. Robin Keller, Pamela Keltyka, Joanna Ho
Publication date: 9 December 2005
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-005-3553-8
Cites Work
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Bayesian decisions with ambiguous belief aversion
- Hopes and fears: The conflicting effects of risk ambiguity
- Effects of outcome and probabilistic ambiguity on managerial choices
- Effects of vague probabilities and of vague payoffs on preference: A model comparison analysis
Cited In (2)
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