Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.08.003zbMath1182.91105MaRDI QIDQ846507

Michi Nishihara, Takashi Shibata

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; real options; agency problem; debt financing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91G50: Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.)

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