Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict
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Publication:846507
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.08.003zbMath1182.91105OpenAlexW2009859711MaRDI QIDQ846507
Michi Nishihara, Takashi Shibata
Publication date: 9 February 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.08.003
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)
Related Items (9)
Investment timing, debt structure, and financing constraints ⋮ Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders ⋮ Strategic investment timing under asymmetric access charge regulation in telecommunications ⋮ Investment strategies, reversibility, and asymmetric information ⋮ Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information ⋮ Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms ⋮ Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt ⋮ Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects ⋮ Liquidation, fire sales, and acquirers' private information
Cites Work
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- Finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment
- The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship
- The effect of mean reversion on investment under uncertainty
- Corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets
- The effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model
- Devaluating projects and the investment-uncertainty relationship
- Real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information
- On the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real options model
- Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework
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