Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
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Publication:2143892
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01349-6zbMath1492.91411OpenAlexW3129516073MaRDI QIDQ2143892
Rose-Anne Dana, Milo Bianchi, Elyès Jouini
Publication date: 31 May 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/42323/1/wp_tse_1181.pdf
Related Items (2)
Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and mispricing in financial markets ⋮ Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
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