A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0511-8zbMATH Open1217.91108OpenAlexW2003322973MaRDI QIDQ623449FDOQ623449
Authors: Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis 
Publication date: 14 February 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0511-8
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- Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
- Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
- Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima
- The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm
- Profit maximization mitigates competition
- The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Are incomplete markets able to achieve minimal efficiency?
- Shareholder voting
- Tender Offers and Leverage
- Endogenous information acquisition with Cournot competition
- Who controls Allianz? Measuring the separation of dividend and control rights under cross-ownership among firms
Cited In (24)
- Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control
- Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
- Competition in a stock market with small firms
- Production externalities: internalization by voting
- Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies
- Negotiated block trade and rebuilding of trust
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- Corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets
- Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities
- Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation
- Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
- Who controls Allianz? Measuring the separation of dividend and control rights under cross-ownership among firms
- Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model
- Buying shares and/or votes for corporate control
- When do imperfectly competitive firms maximize profits? The lessons from a simple general equilibrium model with shareholders' voting
- Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets
- Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
- Determinants of Intercorporate Shareholdings *
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- A Game-Theoretic Model of Corporate Takeovers by Major Stockholders
- Strategic pricing of equity issues
- Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control
- Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
- The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency
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