A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091148 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
- Are incomplete markets able to achieve minimal efficiency?
- Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima
- Endogenous information acquisition with Cournot competition
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
- Profit maximization mitigates competition
- Shareholder voting
- Social choice and individual values
- Tender Offers and Leverage
- The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition
- The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm
- Who controls Allianz? Measuring the separation of dividend and control rights under cross-ownership among firms
Cited in
(25)- The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency
- Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
- Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control
- Competition in a stock market with small firms
- Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
- Production externalities: internalization by voting
- Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies
- Negotiated block trade and rebuilding of trust
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- Corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets
- Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities
- Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation
- Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
- Who controls Allianz? Measuring the separation of dividend and control rights under cross-ownership among firms
- Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model
- Buying shares and/or votes for corporate control
- When do imperfectly competitive firms maximize profits? The lessons from a simple general equilibrium model with shareholders' voting
- Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets
- Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
- Determinants of Intercorporate Shareholdings *
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- A Game-Theoretic Model of Corporate Takeovers by Major Stockholders
- Strategic pricing of equity issues
- Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
- Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control
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