A Game-Theoretic Model of Corporate Takeovers by Major Stockholders

DOI10.1287/MNSC.33.4.467MaRDI QIDQ3753833zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors I. Y. Powers

Publication date 1987

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.33.4.467

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstockholdersoceanic gamescorporate takeover bidsexchange between cash and decision powerthreat-resistant strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Operations research and management science (90B99)

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• A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions

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