The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm *

DOI10.1023/A:1009829729075MaRDI QIDQ4943152zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Norvald Instefjord

Publication date 10 August 2000

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009829729075

zbMATH Keywords

agency paradigmmarket for corporate controlmergers and acquisitionstakeovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(5)

• Corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets
• Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation
• Do private acquirers pay less compared to public acquirers?
• Management and takeover decisions
• Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers

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