Bribes, power, and managerial control in corporate voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00134107zbMATH Open0673.90110MaRDI QIDQ1121192FDOQ1121192

Authors: Robert A. Jarrow, J. Chris Leach 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

coreShapley values\(\psi\)-stable pairscorporate control transfercorporate voting gamesmanagerial actionsProxy fights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Axioms for Shapley values in games with quarrelling
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium
• Constrained \(n\)-person games

Cited In (1)

• Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

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