Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

DOI10.1007/S11238-004-5644-4zbMATH Open1107.91015OpenAlexW4233569905MaRDI QIDQ2487778FDOQ2487778

Authors: Enrico Denti, Nando Prati 

Publication date: 8 August 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Indirect control of corporations
• An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

Cited In (4)

• An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations
• Indirect control of corporations
• Indirect control of corporations: analysis and simulations
• Indirect control and power in mutual control structures

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