Agenda control in coalition formation

DOI10.1007/s003550200155zbMath1072.91660OpenAlexW3121736181MaRDI QIDQ2567949

Francis Bloch, Stéphane Rottier

Publication date: 14 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9934.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional bargaininggovernment formationagenda controlfinite bargaining rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

The formateurs' role in government formation ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games

This page was built for publication: Agenda control in coalition formation