Agenda control in coalition formation

DOI10.1007/S003550200155MaRDI QIDQ2567949zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, Stéphane Rottier

Publication date 14 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9934.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

agenda controlcoalitional bargainingfinite bargaining rulesgovernment formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

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(7)

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• Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations
• POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
• Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes
• Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
• Information design for weighted voting
• The formateurs' role in government formation

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