POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400173zbMath1275.91142MaRDI QIDQ2852567

Luc Leruth, Yves Cramer

Publication date: 9 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

votingpower indexsimple gamescorporate governanceownership structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (6)

Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures ⋮ Effectivity and power ⋮ Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations ⋮ Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Indirect control and power in mutual control structures

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