Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
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Publication:4099443
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- On the axiomatic characterization of the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values
- Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
- On the strong monotonicity of power indices
- The multilinear extension and the modified Banzhaf-Coleman index
- Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure
- Generalized coalitional semivalues
- Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)
- The least square nucleolus is a normalized Banzhaf value
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
- The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
- Decomposition of the space of TU-games, strong transfer invariance and the Banzhaf value
- Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes
- A note on regular semivalues
- Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
- Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
- Cooperative games on antimatroids
- A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: computing the power of the political groups in the European parliament
- The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
- Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- A general procedure to compute mixed modified semivalues for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks
- Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations
- Computation of several power indices by generating functions
- An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
- The multilinear extension of the quotient game
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
- A review of some recent results on power indices
- Notes on a comment on 2-efficiency and the Banzhaf value
- Proof systems and transformation games
- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
- Two-step coalition values for multichoice games
- Characterizations ofk-Convex Games
- Comparing power indices
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations
- The multilinear extension and the symmetric coalition Banzhaf value
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games
- Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
- A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
- \(\alpha\)-decisiveness in simple games
- A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
- A method to calculate generalized mixed modified semivalues: application to the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012--2016)
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
- Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
- Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
- A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
- Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value
- A decisiveness index for simple games
- Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom
- Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
- Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
- Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions
- The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
- On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
- The Apportionment of Representation and The Voting Power
- Semivalues as power indices.
- Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions
- A new Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalitions
- Protectionism and blocking power indices
- Coalition configurations and share functions
- The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
- Semivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games
- Measuring the relevance of factors in the occurrences of events
- Necessary players and values
- Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
- Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
- The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
- Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues
- Power indices under specific multicriteria status
- A generalized Deegan-Packel index for multialternative voting games in case of nonhomogeneous voters
- Partnership formation and multinomial values
- Assessing systematic sampling in estimating the Banzhaf-Owen value
- Statistics and game theory: estimating coalitional values in R software
- The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games
- The Banzhaf value for generalized probabilistic communication situations
- The proportional partitional Shapley value
- New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value
- Alternative formulation and dynamic process for the efficient Banzhaf-Owen index
- Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
- The prediction value
- The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
- Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
- Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation
- Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set
- The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity
- Power allocation rules under fuzzy behavior and multicriteria situations
- Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
- Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
- Some open problems in simple games
- Potentials and reduced games for share functions
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