The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.12.001zbMATH Open1291.91016OpenAlexW2164450743MaRDI QIDQ2452807FDOQ2452807

André Casajus

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68233

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Associated consistency and Shapley value
• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
• Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
• Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Subjective evaluations of n-person games

Cited In (14)

• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• Uniqueness of the Shapley value
• The Shapley value in the non differentiable case
• Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• New axiomatizations of the Owen value
• A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
• A new Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalitions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley-Shubik power index

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