Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value

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Publication:719050


DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1zbMath1232.91028MaRDI QIDQ719050

André Casajus

Publication date: 27 September 2011

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1


91A12: Cooperative games


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