Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
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Publication:719050
DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1zbMath1232.91028OpenAlexW2043500207MaRDI QIDQ719050
Publication date: 27 September 2011
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9171-1
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Cites Work
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- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
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