A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
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Recommendations
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
Cites work
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
- On a class of solidarity values
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Random marginal and random removal values
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(11)- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Recursive and bargaining values
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The potential and consistency of the Owen value for fuzzy cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
- The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
- A fuzzy value for the fuzzy TU-game based on the relative group marginal contribution of coalition with restricted size
- Generalization of weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
- A dividend-based approach to the solidarity value: structural decomposition and axiomatic characterizations
- Extension of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games
- A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
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