A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
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Publication:826630
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01262-2zbMath1455.91033OpenAlexW3031753297MaRDI QIDQ826630
Rong Zou, Gen-Jiu Xu, Xun-Feng Hu, Wen-Zhong Li
Publication date: 6 January 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01262-2
Related Items (4)
The potential and consistency of the Owen value for fuzzy cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values
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