A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
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Publication:826630
The paper introduces a revenue allocation system with a guarantee of basic interests, which integrates the egalitarianism with the marginalism. Therefore, a player's payoff consists of the basic interests and the performance-based payoff. This is a compromised solution between the Owen value and the equal coalitional division value.
Recommendations
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
- A note on compromise values.
- A value for partially defined cooperative games
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
Cites work
- A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
- An implementation of the Owen value.
- Bargaining and Value
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- On new characterizations of the Owen value
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
Cited in
(21)- A reduced Harsanyi power solution for cooperative games with a weight vector
- The extension of combinatorial solutions for cooperative games
- Coalition resilient outcomes in max k-cut games
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- An extensive partial cooperative game with a multi-coalition structure
- Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games
- Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
- A reference point approach to coalition games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3883982 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5077216 (Why is no real title available?)
- New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
- A Unified Strategy for Solution Seeking in Graphical $N$-Coalition Noncooperative Games
- The potential and consistency of the Owen value for fuzzy cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
- The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
- The in-group egalitarian Owen values
- Quasi-Owen value for games on augmenting systems with a coalition structure
- On compromised value for cooperative games with graph communication structures
- Fair allocation in hierarchies: a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism
- Generalization of weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
- Cooperative games with diversity constraints
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