The -egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
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The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
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Cites work
- A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
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- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
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- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of k-lateral Shapley values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction of a second channel: Implications for pricing and profits
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains
- Pricing and quality level decisions of substitutable products in online and traditional selling channels: game‐theoretical approaches
- Pricing policies for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain
- Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- The Banzhaf value and communication situations
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
- The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
- Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions
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