The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure

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Publication:2268115


DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.002zbMath1198.91067MaRDI QIDQ2268115

Gerard van der Laan, Zaifu Yang, Adolphus J. J. Talman, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/24359ac5-6399-42ee-8f0b-7024fe1ba613


90B18: Communication networks in operations research

91A43: Games involving graphs

91B12: Voting theory


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