Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0277-7zbMATH Open1236.91020OpenAlexW1675938143MaRDI QIDQ662276FDOQ662276

Authors: Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal 

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20955/1/MPRA_paper_20955.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecompensationsequal surplus divisioncompensation solutionsrelative fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Value, consistency, and random coalition formation
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
• The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
• Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends

Cited In (7)

• Efficient extensions of communication values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
• Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Pyramidal values
• Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure
• On the position value for special classes of networks

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