Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0277-7zbMath1236.91020MaRDI QIDQ662276

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20955/1/MPRA_paper_20955.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; compensations; equal surplus division; compensation solutions; relative fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

On the Position Value for Special Classes of Networks, Pyramidal values, Efficient extensions of communication values, Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value, Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure

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