Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:662276
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0277-7zbMath1236.91020OpenAlexW1675938143MaRDI QIDQ662276
Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 22 February 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20955/1/MPRA_paper_20955.pdf
Related Items (6)
Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution ⋮ Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ Pyramidal values ⋮ On the Position Value for Special Classes of Networks
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
- Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
- Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
- Value, consistency, and random coalition formation
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
This page was built for publication: Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games