Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0277-7MaRDI QIDQ662276zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date 22 February 2012

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20955/1/MPRA_paper_20955.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecompensationsequal surplus divisioncompensation solutionsrelative fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
• The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• Value, consistency, and random coalition formation
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river

Cited in

(7)

• On the position value for special classes of networks
• Efficient extensions of communication values
• Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1642342 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pyramidal values
• Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure

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