Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2136167
DOI10.1007/S10878-021-00811-4zbMATH Open1492.91024OpenAlexW3201695994MaRDI QIDQ2136167FDOQ2136167
Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Publication date: 10 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- On weighted Shapley values
- The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- An extension of the \(\tau\)-value to games with coalition structures.
- Values for games with two-level communication structures
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- Modification of the Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
- A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
- An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
- Strongly balanced cooperative games
- Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
- The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
- Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
- Discounted tree solutions
- Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
- Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions
- Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values
- Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure
- Equivalence and axiomatization of solutions for cooperative games with circular communication structure
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2136167)