Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution

DOI10.1007/S10878-021-00811-4MaRDI QIDQ2136167zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date 10 May 2022

Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4

zbMATH Keywords

treeTU-gamecoalition structureMyerson valueOwen valueaverage tree solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(3)

• Allocation rules for communication situations with incompatibilities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7156469 (Why is no real title available?)
• Values for cooperative games with a prior unions and a communication graph based on combined effects

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