Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution

DOI10.1007/S10878-021-00811-4zbMATH Open1492.91024OpenAlexW3201695994MaRDI QIDQ2136167FDOQ2136167

Authors: Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal 

Publication date: 10 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4

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zbMATH Keywords

treeTU-gamecoalition structureMyerson valueOwen valueaverage tree solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited In (3)

• Allocation rules for communication situations with incompatibilities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Values for cooperative games with a prior unions and a communication graph based on combined effects

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