Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
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Publication:4190476
DOI10.1137/0135026zbMath0404.90103OpenAlexW1991070015MaRDI QIDQ4190476
Publication date: 1978
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0135026
N-Person Cooperative GameShapley ValueGames in Characteristic Function FormBanzhaf Power IndexDictatorial IndexPolitical GameZero Index
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