Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value

DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00660-wzbMath1426.91019OpenAlexW2781256911MaRDI QIDQ2329411

Ori Haimanko

Publication date: 17 October 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1713.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrydummypositivityBanzhaf power indextransfersimple gamesBanzhaf valuesemivaluescomposition propertycompound games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

The Banzhaf value for generalized probabilistic communication situations ⋮ Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value

Cites Work

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• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
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• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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