Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
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Publication:2486150
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.002zbMath1114.91012OpenAlexW2040297374MaRDI QIDQ2486150
Ori Haimanko, Ezra Einy, Pradeep Dubey
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.002
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Cites Work
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- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
- Semivalues of Simple Games
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
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